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The Semi-Autonomous Administrative State
Cary Coglianese*
Conflicting views about presidential control of the administrative state have
too long been characterized in terms of a debate over agency independence.
But the term “independent” when used to describe administrative agencies
carries with it the baggage of an unhelpful and unrealistic dichotomy:
administrative agencies that are (or should be) subservient to presidential
control versus those that are (or should be) entirely free from such influence.
No agency fits into either category. This essay proposes reorienting the
debate over presidential control around agency “autonomy,” which better
conveys that the key issue is a matter of degree. Contrary to some proponents
of the unitary executive theory, for example, all agencies—even departments
headed by officials who can be removed by the president at will—should
possess autonomy. They need autonomy to be able to make expert, evidencebased judgments and to avoid becoming weaponized purely for self-interested
purposes or to gain partisan advantage. That said, in a democracy, agencies
also ought never to operate with complete autonomy to the extent that they
function with no constraints. The best notion of the administrative state
borrows from anthropologist Sally Falk Moore’s notion of the semi-autonomy
of law, leading to the conclusion that administrative agencies are semiautonomous institutions. This essay is based on remarks delivered on a
plenary panel at the 2018 Federalist Society’s National Lawyers Convention.
***
I want to talk about the distinction between so-called independent agencies
and executive agencies.1 My main thesis today is that, when considering the issue
around which this panel has been organized—balancing insulation and
accountability—there is a better concept to apply than agency independence.
“Independence” normally leads administrative lawyers to think about conditions
for the removal of the head of an agency. The better concept to use when balancing
insulation and accountability is agency “autonomy.” Instead of a strict binary
distinction between independent and executive agencies, autonomy comes in
degrees.
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Furthermore, all agencies—even executive agencies—need some good
amount of autonomy. Indeed, in this regard, an even better way to think about
agency autonomy is as “semi-autonomy,” to borrow from Harvard anthropologist
Sally Falk Moore.2
A focus on autonomy is intended to go beyond formal structures of agencies,
such as the for-cause removal protection. It is a way of capturing a broad theme
within administrative law that emphasizes the importance of neutral expertise, and
not partisan ideology, as a driver of decisions within administrative government. In
fact, one could say the notion of a government of laws, and not of men or women,
suggests an autonomy to law itself that is often viewed as highly desirable and
valuable. It's that same notion of separation, that same autonomy, which is also
valuable within administrative government.
Law enforcement and administrative functions should be carried out in a
neutral, expert manner that advances the public value choices that are reflected in
law. It should not be driven by—at the administrative level—the personal or
political preferences of the prosecutors or administrators.
Much of administrative law reflects this desire for administrative autonomy.
Take the Supreme Court decision in the State Farm case.3 In that case, the Court
made clear that the arbitrary and capricious standard in the APA4 calls for agencies
to make decisions based on reasons and on a careful consideration of evidence—
not just on the basis of politics, such as from a change in administration.5 Autonomy
is vital to ensure that administrative government is based upon sound science, on
evidence and expertise. That is what we're really after with autonomy, and that is
why all agencies need autonomy.
With operational autonomy in mind as a value for government, we can pause
to look again at the formal distinctions between independent and executive
agencies. Although these two types of agencies are often characterized or
distinguished based upon the presence of a good-cause or for-cause removal
limitation, we can benefit from thinking about how that formal distinction has just
a contingent relationship with autonomy. In other words, formal independence may
or may not advance autonomy.
I think a focus on autonomy is important for a couple of reasons. First, moving
past distinctions in agencies based on formal independence matters because, as I
have indicated, both kinds of agencies in the traditional dichotomy between
executive and independent agencies should have some degree of autonomy.
Second, the contingent relationship between formal structures and the actual level
of agency autonomy suggests that we should look beyond formalities and ask how
agencies are really operating.
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A good bit of current research on the nature of agency independence is
pointing the way. For example, Ricky Revesz and Kirti Datla have a terrific article
that shows, even at a structural level, how what constitutes formal independence of
an agency is continuous, not necessarily a binary distinction.6 When we shift to
operational autonomy itself, that is definitely on a continuum.
For many years, the OECD has been recommending to governments around
the world that they promote independence of regulatory authorities by using formal
structures.7 But most recently—in its most recent reports on agency and regulatory
independence—the OECD has recommended not focusing solely on formal
structures, but recommending the primary goal of ensuring de facto
independence—or autonomy.8
Autonomy is also helpful in expanding the scope of the pressures that can
affect what agencies do—and what kinds of pressures we need to be concerned
about negatively affecting governmental performance. The formal, independent–
executive distinction focuses squarely on the President's role in the day-to-day
shaping of administration. And that's one factor affecting autonomy, to be sure. But
so, too, is it important to ensure agencies operate with autonomy from pressures
from special interest groups—that is, they avoid regulatory capture—as well as
possess autonomy from pressures from unrepresentative congressional committees
and their political niches—what Hugh Heclo called “issue networks”9 and others
have called “iron triangles.”10
Autonomy may also help us think harder about, and understand more clearly,
calls for separation from, or a degree of insulation from, judicial oversight.
Remember, the Supreme Court itself said in Vermont Yankee that the judiciary—
an unelected institution—should not be imposing its own procedural requirements
on agencies or otherwise driving the direction of the administrative state.11
As a positive or empirical matter, then, agencies do have autonomy, even if
they are not formally structured to be independent. And as a normative or legal
6
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matter, all agencies should strive toward autonomy.12 Of course, they should not be
fully autonomous. They should be accountable as well. And this is where the notion
of semi-autonomy comes in, a notion that goes back at least to 1973 in a famous
article by Harvard anthropologist Sally Falk Moore.13 Moore was an
anthropologist, not an administrative lawyer. And she wrote about the law itself as
operating as a semi-autonomous force within society, that is, as an institution that
is both shaped by society—social and political factors—at the same time it is also
tries to shape society—social relations, political conduct, and so forth.14
Law in a semi-autonomous sense is much like the bank of a river, with the
water serving as a metaphor for society and for social pressures. A riverbank does
shape the direction of the flow of the water. But the water also bumps up against
the riverbank—sometimes it even overflows it—and in the process the water shapes
the direction and shape and angle of the riverbank itself.
The challenge with semi-autonomy, as a prescriptive matter, is finding the
optimal degree of semi-autonomy for administrative agencies. Semi-autonomy
recognizes the mix that Chris Edley spoke of with his trichotomy of administrative
law: legal doctrine, science, and politics all mixed together.15
This notion of semi-autonomy, of breaking free of the binary distinction
between independent and executive agencies, can give us some purchase and some
direction with respect to questions of the design of the administrative state. Semiautonomy recognizes that all agencies need autonomy—but it also allows for the
possibility that the precise degree could, and should, vary.
Let me close by saying a few words about what autonomy and semi-autonomy
might have to offer to the issue of regulatory analysis and whether to bring so-called
independent agencies under the rubric of Executive Order 12,866.
I recognize the desire for improving regulatory analysis at agencies like the
Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Communications Commission,
Federal Trade Commission, and so forth.16 Numerous studies have suggested that
these agencies don’t conduct regulatory analysis as often or as well as so-called
executive branch agencies.17 That is what gives rise to the call … for applying the
OIRA review process to these so-called independent agencies.
But it is worth considering another approach, one that falls between the
extremes of the status quo, with no requirement for independent agencies to conduct
regulatory analysis before issuing major new rules, and the full application of OIRA
review to these agencies. It is surely worth looking at a middle ground when the
12
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extremes are either undesirable—after all, we've been living with the world with
virtually no requirements for these agencies—or practically unattainable—as I
think application of OIRA review would be. After all, notwithstanding
recommendations from organizations like ACUS and from a variety of scholars
who suggest that Presidents could lawfully subject independent agencies to an
OIRA-like review process, it simply hasn't happened.
Other than an all-or-nothing choice, we could take a modest step, a semi-step,
if you will: require agencies that are defined as independent under the Paperwork
Reduction Act18 to comply with the requirements of the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act (UMRA), a statute that requires agencies to conduct benefit-cost
analysis before issuing rules that will impose significant costs on the private
sector.19 The advantage of this approach, of withdrawing the exemption that's in
UMRA for the so-called independent agencies, is that it removes any excuse that
independent agencies might have for not doing this kind of regulatory analysis.20 It
doesn't go all the way to subjecting them to White House scrutiny, which would …
be a big change in our prevailing norms and practices in the federal government.21
Ultimately, recognizing the semi-autonomous nature of the administrative
state is important descriptively—it does a better job at describing what's going on
at both executive and so-called independent agencies. But it’s also helpful
prescriptively. It helps break free of binary distinctions with respect to policy
interventions, moving beyond an all-or-nothing approach with respect to regulatory
analysis. The best resolution would be to impose a requirement for benefit-cost
analysis that is judicially enforceable under UMRA.22 This should encourage
agencies to conduct better analysis, and it will, in its way, strike a better balance
between insulation and the kind of accountability that comes from good regulatory
analysis.
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